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Abstract: 
 
This note presents some of the consequences due to the possibility of having early elections. First of all, 
elections, whether exogenously or endogenously determined, are relevant to challenge the well known 
neutrality principle of economic policies under rational expectations. Furthermore, in the particular case of 
being possible to admit early elections, the electoral advantages of right-wing parties in relation to left-wing 
parties suffer a diminishment. 
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1 Introduction
Despite the enormous development of the electoral business cycles literature, the
fact is that the determination of optimally timed elections, or even the study of
the consequences of being possible to call early elections, have been largely ignored.
Some exceptions are, on the empirical side, Cargill and Hutchison (1991) and Ito
(1989,1990), and, on the theoretical side, Balke (1990,1991), Chappell and Keech
(1986), Chappell and Peel (1979), Ito and Park (1988) and Keech and Simon (1985).
Most of these studies consider continuous time ‘first-generation’ models, particularly
Nordhaus’s (1975) type of model. The model that will be considered in this note is
representative of the ‘second-generation’ models; specifically, a rational expectations
discrete time model.
The problem of deriving the optimal frequency of elections can be approached
in two ways according to whom, government or society, the optimality concerns.
Generally speaking, the first studies on the issue adopted the society viewpoint, since
the problem was solved through the detection of the electoral period length that led
to outcomes closest to the ones obtained by a benevolent social planner.1 The more
recent studies, in general, do not follow this approach, as the electoral period length
is determined endogenously as part of the incumbent’s optimal programme.
Before proceeding with a formal model, one should start by noting that an early
election being possible to exist implies, by itself, important consequences. As it will
be clearer later on, the possibility of calling an early election introduces additional
uncertainty, at every period of the mandate with which the incumbent has to deal. To
put it more specifically, the uncertainty of election results creates a temporary infla-
tion surprise which may not be attributed to a deliberate choice of the government. In
this sense, while within the exogenous timing of elections framework, the incumbent
may ignore the uncertainty regarding the election results, the endogenous timing of
elections introduces an(other) source of uncertainty, at every moment of time, which
the government cannot ignore. This argument can be formalised as follows.
As it is well known, the presence of forward-looking rational agents induces opti-
mal solution paths characterised by ‘perturbations’ or ‘shocks’ around the moment of
elections. In this sense, assuming a partisan approach, the intrinsic uncertainty about
the election results, which, therefore, can be considered macroeconomic news, leads
to a sudden jump in the relevant economic variables, such as inflation or exchange
rates on the election day.2
1Following this perspective, Keech and Simon (1985) show that the optimal electoral period length
for a Nordhaus (1975)’s type of model depends crucially on the parameterisation of the model.
2For the exchange rates case see, inter alia, Gärtner (1986). The same kind of exchange rate path
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Let us formalise the argument by considering a structural model as follows:
[
yt+1
zet+1
]
=
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
[
yt
zt
]
+
[
b11
b12
]
xt, (1)
where
• yt+1 is a state variable pre-determined at t;3
• zt is an expectational variable free to take on any value at time t with expected
value, held in t, for next period zet+1; and
• xt is an instrument under control of the government.
For the rational expectations case, that is when zet+1 = E [zt+1|It] , Blanchard and
Kahn (1980) show that the unique solution — for the saddle-path stable model — is
given by
yt = y0 for t = 0 (2)
= λ1yt−1 + b11xt−1 + ((λ1 − a11)λ1 − a12λ2)
∞∑
i=0
λ−i−1
2
E [xt+i−1|It−1] , for t > 0;
zt = a
−1
12
(
(λ1 − a11) yt + ((λ1 − a11)λ1 − a12λ2)
∞∑
i=0
λ−i−1
2
E [xt+i|It]
)
, for t ≥ 0,
(3)
where λ1 and λ2 denote, respectively, the stable and unstable eigenvalues of the
matrix A in (1), that is |λ1| < 1 and |λ2| > 1.
Hence, as we know from (2) and (3), the dependence of the state and expectational
variables on expected values for the instruments makes clear how the existence of
elections implies changes in the solution trajectories.
Let us suppose that the current government is committed to a fixed policy xG
and that an election will take place in t = T , which, in the case of the opposition
party’s victory will correspond to a change in policy to xO. This means that, until
the election takes place, i.e. for t ≤ T , the expectational variable will take some
can be obtained, in a political approach, if the government (optimally) uses the exchange rate as a
policy instrument in order to explore the well-known J-curve structure of a small open economy; see
Ploeg (1989).
3A pre-determined variable is a function only of variables known at time t, that is of variables in
the information set It, so that yt+1 = yet+1 whatever the realisation of the variables in It+1.
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value depending on xG and on x¯ ≡ E [x], while, after T , the expectational variable
will be based on xO or xG, as the following figure illustrates:

Figure 1: The uncertainty induced by elections
t
xG xG
E [x]
xO
T
Because zt, for t ≤ T, will depend on known and expected policy values, then in
algebraic terms
zt = a
−1
12
(
(λ1 − a11) yt + ((λ1 − a11)λ1 − a12λ2)
(
T−t∑
i=0
λ−i−1
2
xGt+i +
∞∑
i=T−t+1
λ−i−1
2
E [xt+i]
))
.
But, as soon as the election takes place, and thus, the same policy xG is applied
— in the case of re-election of the current government — or a different one xO is
implemented — in the case of an electoral defeat — then E [xt+i] can be replaced by
xG or xO, which will correspond to a ‘jump’ in the expectational variable and, via
(2), also a ‘jump’ in the state variables. In fact, as the saddle-path depends on
the expected values of the control variables, the occurrence of elections changes the
position of this equilibrium path. Thus, in order to ‘put’ the system on the ‘new’
saddle-path the expectational variables have to ‘jump’.
What was said before has a clear analogy with the analysis of announced or unan-
nounced — but not in the sense of a deliberate surprise/cheating — policy changes.
If the winning political party literally changes the economic policy at the same mo-
ment that electoral results are known, this can be associated with the case of an
unannounced, unanticipated policy change. On the contrary, if there is a relevant lag
before the victorious party really assumes power and starts making new economic
policy, this can be associated with the case of an anticipated policy change. In this
last case, the news is known on the election day, but concerns a policy change some
time in the future.
Generally speaking, the fact that election results can be considered news is of
decisive importance to the partisan vision of electoral cycles. Let us then proceed
with the study of some of the consequences of the possibility of calling early elections,
from a rational partisan viewpoint.
3
2 On some of the consequences of being possible to call
early elections
In order to better evaluate the consequences of may having a call for early elections,
let us first consider the exogenous timing of elections case as a benchmark situation.
For the incumbent, let us assume that popularity in each period of the mandate,
which goes from t = 1 to t = T, depends upon output levels, yt,4 and inflation, pit,
as follows:
V =
T∑
t=1
βt
(
−
1
2
pi2t + θyt
)
, 5 (4)
where, in accordance to an aggregate supply curve à la Lucas (1973):
yt = α (pit − pi
e
t ) , (5)
piet are the inflation expectations, for period t, at time t− 1, given by
piet = E [pit|It−1] , (rational expectations assumption) (6)
and It−1 is the information set available at the end of period (t− 1) .
As it will become clearer later below, the consequences of a call for early elections
are richer if there are ideological differences in accordance to the type of party in
power. Let us then consider two possible kinds of governments, i = L,R, which differ
in their relative concern about output in that their objective functions are given by
V =
T∑
t=1
βt
(
−
1
2
pi2t + θ
iyt
)
, (7)
where θL > θR. In words, right-wing governments (i = R) favour less inflationary
results than left-wing governments (i = L). See (5).
Taking expected inflation, piet , as given in the optimisation of (4) subject to (5)
and (6), the incumbent determines time-consistent inflation rates piit as follows:
piit = αθ
i i = L,R. (8)
For 2 ≤ t ≤ T , the rationality of expectations imply that piet = pit, which means
yt = 0⇔ Yt = Y¯ . (9)
4As it is usual, output, Yt, is measured from the natural level, Y¯ , such that yt = Yt − Y¯ .
5Ever since Nordhaus (1975), this is, indeed, one of the most common types of objective functions
in the area of political macroeoconomics.
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Voters who are rational and forward-looking know the two governments’ objective
functions and hence can compute their two optimal inflation rates (8). Although these
policies are known, since it is assumed that the distribution of voters’ preferences is
unknown, the electoral results are unknown; see Alesina et al. (1997), pg. 55. Hence,
for the period immediately after the elections, t = 1, expected inflation pie1 is an
average of αθL and αθR weighted by the probabilities that each type of government
will be in office.6 That said, for t = 1, the expected inflation will not, in general,
coincide with the effective inflation rate as
pie1 = ppi
L
1 + (1− p)pi
R
1
= pαθL + (1− p)αθR,
where p is defined to be the probability of a left-wing electoral victory.
Given that θL > θR, a term of office beginning in period t = 1 will be characterised
by
pie1 < pi
L
1 ⇒ y1 = (1− p)α
2
(
θL − θR
)
> 0⇔ Y1 > Y¯ , if L is in office,
pie1 > pi
R
1 ⇒ y1 = pα
2
(
θR − θL
)
< 0⇔ Y1 < Y¯ , if R is in office,
and, for 2 ≤ t ≤ T,
piet = pi
L
t ⇒ yt = 0⇔ Yt = Y¯ , if L is in office,
piet = pi
R
t ⇒ yt = 0⇔ Yt = Y¯ , if R is in office.
In words, output is above (resp. below) its natural level in the first period of
a left (resp. right)-wing government.7 Every other period until the next election,
as expectations perfectly adjust, output will be at its natural level, independently
of the kind of incumbent. Inflation, in turn, will always be higher during left-wing
governments. Hence, in this case, decreasing (resp. increasing) the electoral period
length will, on average and in the case of power rotation, create a higher (resp. lower)
volatility (costly fluctuations) of output and inflation rates.8
6As in most of the literature, we will assume exogenous probabilities. Ellis (1991) is, to the best
of my knowledge, the only study to consider endogenous probabilities. See also Ellis and Thoma
(1991).
7This is also known as the partisan effect.
8This means that there may be intermediate values of inflation rates, piR < pi∗ < piL such that
both types of governments would be better off if both implement pi∗ rather than their preferred
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That being said, it is possible to determine the utility registered by society during
the mandate of each kind of government. Assuming that social instantaneous utility
is given by:
Ut = −
1
2
pi2t + θyt, (10)
and that society evaluates the levels of (10) in accordance with a social rate of dis-
count, ρ, social welfare in case of a left-wing government is given by:
UL = ρ
(
−
1
2
(
αθL
)2
+ θ
(
α (1− p)
(
αθL − αθR
)))
+
T∑
t=2
ρt
(
−
1
2
(
αθL
)2
+ θ (0)
)
= ρ
(
−
1
2
(
αθL
)2
+ θ
(
α2 (1− p)
(
θL − θR
)))
−
1
2
α2
(
θL
)2 ρ2 − ρT+1
1− ρ
, (11)
whereas, in case of a right-wing government is given by:
UR = ρ
(
−
1
2
(
αθR
)2
+ θ
(
α2p
(
θR − θL
)))
+
T∑
t=2
ρt
(
−
1
2
(
αθR
)2
+ θ (0)
)
= ρ
(
−
1
2
(
αθR
)2
+ θ
(
α2p
(
θR − θL
)))
−
1
2
α2
(
θR
)2 ρ2 − ρT+1
1− ρ
. (12)
Plainly, for society’s welfare, in general, the kind of party in power is a relevant
fact, as
UL − UR =
1
2
(
θL − θR
)
α2ρ
2θ (1− ρ) +
(
ρT − 1
) (
θL + θR
)
1− ρ
(13)
can assume positive or negative values. Obviously, social welfare would be the same,
no matter the kind of government, when (13) assumes a zero values, which occurs
for:
θ∗ =
1− ρT
1− ρ
θL + θR
2
, (14)
which means:
θ∗ >
θL + θR
2
. (15)
policies piL and piR because the sub-optimality introduced by fluctuations in inflation and output is
eliminated. As we have just noted, one way of reducing these fluctuations on average (but which
does not necessarily mean a loss reduction) is to increase the electoral period length. Alesina (1987)
shows that pi∗ is decreasing (resp. increasing) with the probability of a right (resp. left)-wing electoral
victory because the increase in the bargaining power of each type of government will make pi∗ closer
to their own preferred policies, piL or piR. For this mechanism to be effective, i.e. considered credible,
one naturally has to assume a sufficiently long time horizon for both types of governments and a
sufficiently low discount of future. Almost the same argument is used in the strategic use of budget
deficits literature; see Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994).
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In order to be indifferent between the two possible governments, society has to
possess a parameter θ∗ closer to θL than to θR. This reflects the electoral advantage
that right-wing parties possess, in the sense that the median voter is more likely to
prefer the right-wing party. See figure 2.
Figure 2: The political spectrum for θ (case 1)
θR θ
L+θR
2
θ∗ θL
So far we have implicitly assumed an exogenous timing of elections, therefore
excluding the possibility of an early call of elections. In order to admit that possibility,
let us consider that there is a fixed maximum electoral period length
(
t = T¯
)
and that
τ denote the probability of an election being called at any time t, which is won by
the left-wing and right-wing candidates with probability p and (1− p), respectively.
At this point, it is relevant to note that the timing of events is as follows. In
moment t = 0, the expected rate of inflation for next period is determined, pie1. In
moment t = 1, there is an election, which is followed by the determination of the
inflation rate, pi1, by the incumbent that resulted from that election. The mandate
has an a priori duration, meaning that, if no early election is called (from t = 2)
until t = T¯ , there is an election for sure at t = T¯ +1. For every moment, the expected
rate of inflation is determined before the occurrence of a possible early election and
therefore also before any inflation rate. All in all, the following figure gives a picture
of the timing of events as of from the beginning of a new mandate.

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Figure 3: The timing of events
If so, it is straightforward to verify that,
pie1 = ppi
L
1 + (1− p)pi
R
1
and that, for any period 2 ≤ t ≤ T¯ ,
piet = (1− τ)pi
L
t + τ
(
ppiLt + (1− p)pi
R
t
)
if L is in power in t− 1, (16)
or
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piet = (1− τ)pi
R
t + τ
(
ppiLt + (1− p)pi
R
t
)
if R is in power in t− 1. (17)
The previous expected inflation expressions (16) and (17) show that:
• The possibility of calling an early election imply, by itself, that left-wing man-
dates are characterised by a higher expected inflation level, and via (8) also a
higher effective inflation rate, than in the case of a right-wing mandate. Only at
t = T¯ — or if the public is certain that an election will be called — the expected
inflation is the same independently of who is in power in the previous period.9
• As long as there are partisan differences, i.e. piLt = pi
R
t , any mandate will
be characterised by inflation surprises at every moment, i.e. piit = pi
e
t , ∀t, i =
L,R.10 This is a substantial difference to the exogenous election dates case. The
well known neutrality principle of economic policies under rational expectations
is not at all verifiable. In particular, during a left-wing (resp. right-wing)
mandate, output will be above (resp. below) the natural level as piet < pi
L
t(
resp. piet > pi
R
t
)
. In fact, it is possible to verify that:
piR < pie2,...,T (if R is in power) < pi
e
1 < pi
e
2,...,T (if L is in power) < pi
L.
Hence, assuming an objective function as
U =
T¯∑
t=1
ρt
(
−
1
2
pi2t + θyt
)
, (18)
is less probable that right-wing incumbents will obtain better results measured
by (14) as it was the case with exogenous election dates.
In order to better explore this fact, let us assume that, despite being possible
to call an early election, there is no election of this kind during all the mandate.
If so, social welfare in case of a left-wing government is given by:
UL = ρ
(
−
1
2
(
αθL
)2
+ θ
(
α (1− p)
(
αθL − αθR
)))
+
T∑
t=2
ρt
(
−
1
2
(
αθL
)2
+ θ
(
α
(
αθL −
(
(1− τ)αθL + τ
(
pθL + (1− p) θR
)))))
,
9Note that the algebraic difference between (16) and (17) is
(
piLt − pi
R
t
)
(1− τ) ≥ 0 and that this
does not depend on the probabilities p and (1− p).
10Note that in order to have piet given by (16) (resp. (17)) equal to pi
L
t (resp. pi
R
t ) one should have
piLt = pi
R
t .
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whereas, in case of a right-wing government is given by:
UR = ρ
(
−
1
2
(
αθR
)2
+ θ
(
αp
(
αθR − αθL
)))
+
T∑
t=2
ρt
(
−
1
2
(
αθR
)2
+ θ
(
α
(
αθR −
(
(1− τ)αθR + τ
(
pθL + (1− p) θR
)))))
.
Plainly, the difference between the two levels of utilities is given by:
UL − UR =
1
2
(
θL − θR
)
α2ρ
(
θL + θR
) (
ρT − 1
)
+ 2θ
(
1− ρ+ τρ− τρT
)
1− ρ
,
which shows that, in order for the society to be indifferent between the two types of
government, it must be characterised by a parameter
θ∗ =
1− ρT
1− ρ+ τ (ρ− ρT )
θL + θR
2
, (19)
which shows that, again,
θ∗ >
θL + θR
2
.
Comparing (14) with (19) it is possible to verify that now the median voter is less
likely to prefer the right-wing party. See figures 2 and 4.
Figure 4: The political spectrum for θ (case 2)
θR θ
L+θR
2
θ∗ θL
To finalise, we would like to stress that the probability of calling an early election
was considered constant. In theoretical terms, it has been acknowledged that as the
incumbent’s incentives to call an early election increase as the maximal election date
t = T¯ gets closer, one may assume that the probability τ is monotonically increasing
as t→ T¯ ; see Balke (1990).11 This fact seems to be also confirmed empirically; see the
survival analysis in Caleiro (2000). Therefore, assuming that τ t is indeed increasing
with t, this immediately shows us that during a left-wing (resp. right-wing) mandate
the expected level of inflation piet will decrease (resp. increase) from pi
L
t (resp. pi
R
t ) to
pi∗t ≡ ppi
L
t + (1− p)pi
R
t .
11As Balke (1990) shows, the government has greater incentives to call an election the longer it
has been in power and that, in close connection, the longer is the maximum electoral period duration
the smaller the incentives to call an election at time t.
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3 Conclusions
This note presents some of the consequences due to the possibility of having early
elections. First of all, elections, whether exogenously or endogenously determined, are
relevant to challenge the well known neutrality principle of economic policies under
rational expectations. Furthermore, in the particular case of being possible to admit
early elections, the electoral advantages of right-wing parties in relation to left-wing
parties suffer a diminishment.
References
[1] ALESINA, Alberto (1987), “Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a
Repeated Game”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, CII, August, 651-678.
[2] ALESINA, Alberto, Nouriel ROUBINI and Gerald D. COHEN (1997), Political
Cycles and the Macroeconomy, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[3] BALKE, Nathan S. (1990), “The Rational Timing of Parliamentary Elections”,
Public Choice, 65, 201-216.
[4] BALKE, Nathan S. (1991), “Partisanship Theory, Macroeconomic Outcomes,
and Endogenous Elections”, Southern Economic Journal, 57, No. 4, April, 920-
935.
[5] BLANCHARD, Olivier Jean, and Charles M. KAHN (1980), “The Solution of
Linear Difference Models under Rational Expectations”, Econometrica, 48, No.
5, July, 1305-1311.
[6] CALEIRO, António (2000), ”Para uma Cronologia das Eleições - O que está
para além de uma análise de sobrevivência?”, in Homenagem ao Professor
Augusto da Silva, Departamento de Sociologia, Universidade de Évora, De-
cember, 31-43.
[7] CARGILL, Thomas F., and Michael M. HUTCHISON (1991), “Political Busi-
ness Cycles with Endogenous Election Timing: Evidence from Japan”, The Re-
view of Economics and Statistics, LXXXIII, No. 4, November, 733-739.
[8] CHAPPELL, D., and D.A. PEEL (1979), “On the Political Theory of the Busi-
ness Cycle”, Economics Letters, 2, 327-332.
[9] CHAPPELL Jr., Henry W., and William R. KEECH (1986), “Party Differences
in Macroeconomic Policies and Outcomes”, The American Economic Review
(Papers and Proceedings), 76, No. 2, May, 71-74.
10
[10] ELLIS, Christopher J. (1991), “Endogenous Voting in a Partisan Model with
Rational Voters”, Journal of Macroeconomics, 13, No. 2, Spring, 267-278.
[11] ELLIS, Christopher J., and Mark A. THOMA (1991), “Partisan Effects in
Economies with Variable Electoral Terms”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Bank-
ing, 23, No. 4, November, 728-741.
[12] GÄRTNER, Manfred (1986), “Some Political Economy of Flexible Exchange
Rates”, European Journal of Political Economy, 2/2, 153-168.
[13] ITO, Takatoshi, and Jin Hyuk PARK (1988), “Political Business Cycles in the
Parliamentary System”, Economics Letters, 27, 233-238.
[14] ITO, Takatoshi (1989), “Endogenous Election Timings and Political Business
Cycles in Japan”, Working Paper No. 3128, September, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
[15] ITO, T. (1990), “The Timing of Elections and the Political Business Cycles in
Japan”, Journal of Asian Economics, 1, No. 1, 135-146.
[16] KEECH, William R., and Carl P. SIMON (1985), “Electoral and Welfare Con-
sequences of Political Manipulation of the Economy”, Journal of Economic Be-
havior and Organization, 6, June, 177-202.
[17] LUCAS Jr., Robert E. (1973), “Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation
Tradeoffs”, The American Economic Review”, 63, No. 3, June, 326-334.
[18] MILESI-FERRETTI, Gian Maria, and Enrico SPOLAORE (1994), “How Cyni-
cal can an Incumbent be? Strategic Policy in a Model of Government Spending”,
Journal of Public Economics, 55, 121-140.
[19] NORDHAUS, William D. (1975), “The Political Business Cycle”, The Review
of Economic Studies, 42(2), No. 130, April, 169-190.
[20] PLOEG, F. van der (1989), “The Political Economy of Overvaluation”, The
Economic Journal, 99, September, 850-855.
11
 
Abstract: 
 
 
 
Palavras-chave/Keywords:   
 
Classificação JEL/JEL Classification:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
